This solipsism, that I have baptised the uniqueness hypothesis, is in flat contradiction with Laruelle’s self-affirmed commitment to a “democracy of thought”. Laruelle’s uniqueness hypothesis, which is not asserted explicitly but subtends all that he writes) is the idea that there is only one non-philosopher among all his contemporaries (himself) and that all the others (Deleuze, Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, Badiou, Serres, Stiegler, Latour) are stuck inside the principle of sufficient philosophy. I do not find that the uniqueness hypothesis is demonstrated in Laruelle’s texts, nor is it even a plausible idea.
This solipsism is also in contradiction with Laruelle’s constant positive self-comparison with others. This solipsistic attitude leads not only to a lack of fruitful critical dialogue but also to declining content (and eventually popularity). Laruelle constantly compares and contrasts his own “non-philosophy” with the whole of philosophy and so fails to advance his own problematics in any non-ad hoc way. In Lakatos’s terms Laruelle’s research programme of non-philosophy is in a degenerating phase